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Disaster Preparedness 
study 
A Report to the Citizens of Jacksonville • Summer 1982 
SCOPE OF THE STUDY 
Is Jacksonville prepared for a man-made or 
natural disaster? With the numerous risks of 
encountering disaster in Jacksonville due to 
its geography, weather patterns, transportation 
routes, and mi 1 i tary faci 1 i ties, how can 
disaster preparedness here be improved? 
The term "disaster" in this study refers to the 
occurrence or imminent threat of widespread or 
severe damage, injury, or loss of life and/or 
property resulting from any natural or manmade 
cause. This includes but is not limited to, 
enemy attack, sabotage or other hostile mili-
tary or paramilitary action, fire, flood, 
earthquake, wind storm, wave action, epidemic, 
air contamination, blight, drought, infesta-
tion, explosion, or accident involving 
radiation byproducts. A disaster creates a 
situation in which the day-to-day patterns of 
life are suddenly disrupted and numbers of 
people are plunged into helplessness and 
distress. 
The scope of the study includes a review and 
analysis of: 
Past disasters and the potential for 
future disasters. 
Roles of public and private agencies 
responsible for responding to disasters. 
Methods for communicating among agencies 
and with the population before, during, 
and after disasters. 
• Preparedness programs in similar cities. 
HIGHLIGHTS 
MAJOR PROBLEMS 
Potential for devastating hurricane with insuf-
ficient preparation 
. Multiple emergency operating centers which 
could result in confusion and an ineffective 
response to a major disaster 
Limited knowledge about disasters by pub 1 i c 
and officials 
Inadequate communication among all disaster 
professionals 
Ineffective warning messages 
Planning emphasizing nuclear attack rather 
than hurricanes 
Jacksonville designated as target area for 
nuclear attack 
Lack of emphasis on an all-hazards approach 
to disaster planning 
RECOMMENDED SOLUTIONS 
Provide single Emergency Operating Center 
Increase public knowledge through the Civil 
Defense Division, Red Cross and National 
Weather Service working with the media 
Hold regular meetings of the Civil Defense 
Planning Council and staff. 
• Develop a warning package 
Redirect and rename Civil Defense Division 
Implement an all-hazards approach to 
Disaster Planning 
FINDINGS 
Findings represent the data base of the committee. They are derived from the published materials listed 
in the references. facts reported by resource persons or from a consensus of committee understanding as 
reported by resource persons. 
LIMITED DISASTER EXPERIENCE 
THE LIMITED NUMBER OF DISASTERS IN JACKSONVILLE 
IN RECENT YEARS HAS RESULTED IN AN ILL PREPARED 
CITIZENRY. Due to favorable circumstances over 
the last few years in Jacksonville, no major 
disasters causing great property damage and loss 
of life have occurred. The population has grown 
and new people have moved to the city resulting 
in a substantial number of residents who have 
never experienced a disaster. As a result of 
this lack of experience and population changes. 
many citizens are unprepared. 
For example, most people in Florida have never 
experienced a hurricane. Many who believe they 
have experienced a full force hurricane were in 
a relatively weak storm or an indirect hit. 
People tend to make preparations based on their 
personal recollection of past storms. People 
who have experienced a disaster tend to be more 
prepared. 
Jacksonville's only experience is from an 
indirect hit of hurricane Dora in 1964, a rela-
tively weak storm (Saffir/Simpson category 2). 
Some professionals fear that this, coupled with 
the near miss of hurricane David in 1979, will 
make the people in Jacksonville reluctant to 
evacuate low ground for the next hurricane. 
Hurricane David passed about 70 miles offshore 
and did not affect Jacksonville with any hurri-
cane weather or storm surge. 
The public historically exhibited little 
interest in learning about disasters in order to 
become better prepared. Courses offered through 
the City's Civil Defense Division and the 
National Weather Service usually have limited 
attendance. Elected officials have received 
1 i ttl e or no training and have no experience 
with a major disaster. 
A 1 though the city has had some experience with 
evacuating specific areas threatened by hazard-
ous chemicals and fires, no disaster has had 
sufficient magnitude to require the impl emen-
tation of the Jacksonville Disaster Pre-
paredness Ordinance signed February. 1980. 
HAZARD ANALYSIS 
There are three categories of hazards: natural 
hazards, man-made nonmilitary hazards and man-
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made military hazards. Because of the unique 
character, man-made military hazards, primarily 
nuclear war, will be considered separately. 
Natural Hazards 
THE MOST DEVASTATING NATURAL HAZARD TO WHICH 
JACKSONVILLE IS EXPOSED IS THE HURRICANE. The 
most dangerous part of a hurricane in terms of 
1 i ves 1 os t and damage incurred is the surge. a 
wall of water formed by wind and pressure during 
the hurricane. This wall of water. causing 90% 
of the deaths, is far more dangerous than the 
wind. 
An excellent description of the effects of a 
hurricane surge is provided by John D. McDonald 
in his novel Condominium: 
The gpeat suY'ge has built up in the Gulf, 
built by the gpeatest ?.tJinds woY'king on the 
water' as the shoY'eline shallowed. It was 
like a bY'oad bulge 7Tl)Ving towaY'd the shoY'e. 
It had been enhanoed in size by the seiohe 
effeot, !&tioh oan ooouro !&ten the proessuroe in 
any aroea is so low the the water' is aotuaUy 
suoked up to a gpeateY' level, as though a 
gigantio soda stroaw had been put to use. 
The suY'ge was not in itself a wave. The 
huY'rioane waves roemained, moving at the same 
Pate OY" a little fastero than the suY'ge. It 
was a blaok blistero a few miles in diameter', 
swollen to fifteen feet above the alY'eady 
high level of the huroY'ioane tides. 
A suY'ge Uke this, though not as laroge oro as 
high, had droowned almost fouro hundroed people 
in Louisiana in 1957. Othero suY'ges had sent 
fifteen feet of water' overo Bimini in 1935 
and droowned fouro hundroed in the Florida Keys 
in that same yearo. In Novembero of 1932 a 
huroY'ioane suroge droowned twenty-five hundroed 
in Santa Crouz del SuP, Cuba. On Septembero 
8, 1900, a huY'rioane tide and sto7'm suY'ge 
killed six thousand people in Galveston, 
Te:x:as. 
The suroge 7Tl)Ved just ahead of the eye and a 
little south of it. 
Within historic record, Jacksonville has never 
experienced a "great hurricane" (winds of 125+ 
miles per hour). In fact, written records 
dating back to 1886 indicate that only one full 
hurricane (75 miles per hour) has hit Jackson-
ville. During that same period six tropical 
cyclones (40 miles per hour and over), ·which 
were usually the results of exiting hurricanes 
and near misses from hurricanes, have hit the 
city. 
Based on these long term trends the probability 
of a hurricane occurring in Jacksonville is 
about 1% a year (one hurricane every hundred 
years). The theoretical storm surge height 
during this one hundred year storm has been 
estimated by the National Oceanic and 
Atmospheric Administration, to be about 10 feet. 
Forecasts of storm surge heights from a storm 
are more accurate and relevant than forecasts of 
the wind. 
During a larger storm such as Camille in 1969 or 
the Florida Keys hurricane of 1935 (both con-
side red to be the most severe hurricanes 
recorded for the U.S.), a wall of water of 16-20 
feet can be expected at the beaches. This would 
mean water to the ceiling of the second floor of 
beach hotels. A storm of this magnitude (Force 5 
Saffir/Simpson Scale) can be expected once every 
500 years. The Saffir/Simpson Hurricane Scale 
below describes the characteristics associated 
with various intensities of hurricanes. 
----~----~--~,--------~------------~ 
Saffir--Simpson Hurricane Intensity Scale 
SCALE NUMBER WINDS 
(CATEGORY) MPH 
1 74-95 
2 96-110 
3 111-130 
4 131-155 
5 155 
SURGE 
FT. 
4-5 
6-8 
9-12 
13-18 
18 
DAMAGE 
Minimal 
Moderate 
Extensive 
Extreme 
Catastrophic 
The National Weather Service gives a maximum of 
twelve hours warning before a storm strikes. 
During most of this time the sky may be clear 
and blue with no hint of the approaching storm. 
Some people may be reluctant to evacuate in 
these conditions. The time of day is also a 
factor in a successful evacuation. A storm 
striking at night, such as Camille did on the 
Gulf Coast, allows the people plenty of daylight 
hours for evacuation. However, the evacuation 
would have to occur during the night if the 
storm were expected to strike early in the day. 
In some areas of Florida disaster professionals 
fear that the beaches could not be evacuated 
before a hurricane strikes because of long 
causeways and high population density. The 
people living on the barrier islands of Duval 
County have several coastal evacuation routes. 
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North of the St. Johns River the beach 
population must evacuate north on AlA or west on 
Heckscher Drive. South of the river the west-
ward evacuation must occur on Atlantic Boulevard 
with four lanes; Beach Boulevard, with four 
lanes; and J. Turner Butler Boulevard, with a 
two lane bridge. Feeder roads to these routes 
have a minimum of six feet above mean sea level, 
whi 1 e the approaches to the bridges offer mini-
mums of seven feet above mean sea level. 
Once the storm begins, people who have ignored 
the evacuation warnings will be cut off from 
outside help. Travel through the storm area 
will be impossible due to downed power lines and 
trees as well as high water. Even after the 
storm, transportation problems can make rescue 
efforts and delivery of service impossible. 
Other hazards from hurricanes include flying 
debris and bui 1 ding damage from the high winds, 
tornadoes (which are often formed on the advance 
edge of the hurricane) and flooding from heavy 
rainfall (even after the storm moves ashore and 
loses its hurricane status). 
Other Natural Threats 
THE REMAINING NATURAL HAZARDS THAT THREATEN 
JACKSONVILLE HAVE LESS POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING A 
MAJOR DISASTER. These hazards can cause limited 
death and destruction but will seldom cause the 
type of disaster that involves the disruption of 
society for a great number of people. 
Tornadoes, often occurring in conjunction with 
the hurricane, can cause severe damage and 
death. The Jacksonville area has an average of 
two tornadoes per year with January, February 
and March being the most likely months. Over 
the last 25 years there have been no deaths 
directly related to tornadoes in Jacksonville. 
However, tornadoes cause a great deal of damage 
with winds of up to 300 mi 1 es per hour. These 
winds can destroy substantial structures and a 
great potential for loss of life exists. 
Flood potential in Jacksonville does not pose a 
substantial threat to 1 i fe or wide spread pro-
perty damage in Jacksonville except for the 
flooding accompanying a major hurricane. 
During the last 25 years there has been no loss 
of life due to inland flooding or flash flooding 
in Jacksonville. 
During a hurricane, depending on the tides, wind 
direction, and rainfall, the low-lying areas 
along the rivers in Duval County could be 
subject to extensive flooding. In addition, 
many of the low-lying areas are subject to a 
type of flooding known as "pondi ng" which occurs 
when low lying terrain with relatively imper-
vious soil becomes super-saturated and drainage 
systems can not carry off the excess water. 
Additional natural threats to Jacksonville 
include lightning (often accompanying 
thunderstorms), earthquakes and freezes. None 
of these natural hazards has the potential in 
Jacksonville for causing any widespread property 
damage or loss of life. However, lightning 
kills approximately one person a year in the 
Jacksonville area. 
Man-made Hazards 
JACKSONVILLE, LIKE ANY LARGE METROPOLITAN AREA, 
HAS A VARIETY OF ACTIVITIES AND FEATURES WHICH 
HAVE THE POTENTIAL FOR CAUSING A DISASTER. Some 
examples of these include the use, storage and 
transportation of hazardous and toxic materials; 
the movement of trains, aircraft or other 
vehicles that could wreck; and the possibility 
of a variety of fires. 
Hazardous materia 1 s are transported through and 
used daily in Jacksonville. There are over 1,700 
items classified as hazardous materials and 
regula ted by agencies such as the Department of 
Transportation and the Environmental Protection 
Agency. However, the amount and type of hazard-
ous material being transported through 
Jacksonville on a given day are not known. 
Vehicles are required to be marked only if they 
carry over a certain amount of hazardous 
material leaving the remainder to travel without 
visible identification. 
Approximately 15% of all trucks passing through 
Jacksonville are carrying some type of hazard-
ous materials. There are no controls on the 
routes taken by vehicles transporting hazardous 
materials through Jacksonville, so dangerous 
materials can be transported directly through 
town rather than taking routes through less 
urbanized areas. Many of the trains passing 
through the city also carry these cargos. The 
port handles two hazardous materials in large 
amounts: phosphoric or super phosphoric acid, 
and refined bulk liquid petroleum products. 
Most industries located in Jacksonville, as in 
other cities, use some type of hazardous 
material (some type of flammable material is 
most common). A fire or transportation accident 
involving hazardous materials has potential for 
causing widespread death and destruction. 
The most common hazardous material accidents are 
oil spills. The professionals charged with 
responding to hazardous materials accidents pri-
marily staff from the Coast Guard, Fire 
Department, Office of the Sheriff and 
Bio-Environmental Services Division, are well 
prepared for oil spills. However, accidents 
involving some other materials could cause 
problems. An improperly marked or unmarked 
material may be difficult to identify as the 
city Bio-Environmental Services Division does 
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not have immediate access to the required spe-
cialized equipment for detection. 
Many hazardous materials pose a long term danger 
rather than an immediate threat to 1 ife. Some 
of these materials such as oi 1 containing PCB' s 
(a carcinogen) are . being transported to and 
stored in Jacksonville for eventual disposal. A 
spill of this type of material could cause a 
long term health hazard. 
Fire is another man-made hazard which could 
cause a disaster in Jacksonville, as in any com-
munity. Most fires are kept well under control, 
but a large scale fire, especially in a high-
rise building filled with people could cause a 
disaster. Improvements over the years in 
building codes have made the new high-rise 
buildings very safe, in contrast to older 
buildings without sprinklers. Large forest 
fires approaching built-up sections of the city 
also have potential for loss of life and major 
structural damage. 
SIMILARITIES OF DISASTERS 
ALTHOUGH EVERY DISASTER IS UNIQUE IN A NUMBER OF 
WAYS, EACH CAN BE DESCRIBED BY A LIMITED SET OF 
DIMENSIONS AND EACH WILL HAVE SIMILAR EFFECTS ON 
THE PEOPLE. These dimensions and effects wi 11 
determine which officials and agencies have the 
authority and responsibility to act. 
A significant number of variables can be 
combined to describe a disaster and its effects. 
Each variable has implications for mitigation, 
preparedness, response and recovery activities. 
The following table was adapted from an Ohio 
State University Disaster Research Center 
report. Any disaster can be described by this 
set of variables. 
DIMENSIONS OF A DISASTER 
1. Rate: frequency of occurrence 
a. has never happened before 
b. happens frequently 
c. happens infrequently 
2. Physical characteristics 
a. wind, rain, etc. (climatic) 
b. heat (fire), cold (weather) 
c. silent 
3. Speed of onset 
a. rapid - avalanche, explosion 
b. gradual - some floods, famine, 
drought, hurricane 
c. repetitive - some earthquakes 
,, 
4. Length of forewarning (difference from 
onset) 
a. short - bomb attack, explosion 
b. medium - hurricane 
c. long - pollution buildup in food chain 
5. Duration 
a. short - explosion, etc. 
b. medium - flood, some pollution 
c. long - famine, pollution 
6. Scope of Impact 
a. one house, neighborhood 
b. town, stadium 
c. bio-region, nation 
7. Destructive potential 
a. high property damage, low life-risk 
(fire slow in spreading) 
b. high life-risk, no property loss 
(chemical leak, air pollution 
radioactivity) 
c. variable - both a+ b 
8. Gross Predictability 
a. danger area can be predicted with 
some accuracy but not necessarily 
with a lot of time of forewarning 
(e.g., flood, hurricane,"down-wind 
accidents like chemical releases) 
b. no predictability - no forewarning 
(terrorism, auto accidents, "freak 
accidents") 
c. some forewarning, but no predictabil-
ity (tornadoes, disease spread) 
9. Gross controllability 
(varies with speed of onset, nature, 
amount of warning, all of above) 
All disasters have similar effects on the 
people, places and things as summarized below 
on a table from the State Bureau of Disaster 
Preparedness. 
DIFFERING APPROACHES TO PLANNING 
MANY CIVIL DEFENSE PROFESSIONALS RESIST THE 
NEWER, MORE PRACTICAL AND ECONOMICALLY 
JUSTIFIABLE "ALL HAZARDS" APPROACH TO DISASTER 
PLANNING. These professionals favor the more 
traditional approach, stressing nuclear attack 
planning. These two different philosophies 
determine how local civil defense directors 
approach disaster planning. 
The philosophy of those favoring the traditional 
Civil Defense approach is that by planning for 
the ultimate (nuclear) disaster the city will be 
prepared and able to respond to any smaller more 
local or regional disaster (such as a 
hurricane). These professionals prefer to place 
emphasis on planning and preparation for nuclear 
disasters, believing that these plans will cover 
any of the smaller disasters. 
The other basic philosophy of disaster planning 
states that we should work from the ground up 
on smaller more likely disasters and assumes 
that the nuclear disaster would be covered by 
these plans. This all hazards approach to 
emergency management has been used because of 
financial constraints by the state and some 
local governments for a number of years. Only 
recently have the Federal guidelines been 
changed to allow an all hazards approach. 
Federal legislation during the Cold War era 
initiated civil defense programs in 1951. The 
purpose of the legislation was to provide a 
local mechanism to assist the population during 
a nuclear war. The Federal government provided 
monies for this nuclear civil defense with 
requirements for surveying fallout shelters, 
stocking them with supplies and radiological 
instruments and training peop 1 e to cope with a 
nuclear attack. During these earlier days, 
SUMMARY OF EFFECTS 
MENTAL 
PHYSICAL 
ATTITUDE 
People 
Disoriented, Confused 
Angry 
Frustrated 
Anxious, Concerned 
Frightened 
Upset, Nervous 
Die 
Injured, Sick 
Wounded 
Incapacitated 
Exhausted 
Positive/Negative 
Places 
Destroyed 
Damaged 
Use Limited 
Useless 
Contaminated 
Things 
Lost 
Damaged 
Destroyed 
Use Limited 
Useless 
Value Reduced 
Value Lost 
Effects upon places and things sometimes in-
creases the hazard and the effects upon people 
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peaking with the Cuban missle cr1s1s in 1964, 
civil defense was well funded and directed 
solely at the threat of war. 
The Federal government is the major funding 
source for all disaster preparedness activi-
ties. In the past its guidelines, which 
stressed civil defense, caused state and local 
governments to shield their all hazards approach 
under the umbrella of nuclear planning. Now, 
with recent amendments to the Civil Defense Act, 
Federal monies can legitimately be used for a 
comprehensive, all hazards approach to emergency 
management. 
The Florida legislature passed the State 
Disaster Preparedness Act in 1974, shifting the 
emphasis and requirements of civil defense acti-
vities to an all hazards approach called 
Comprehensive Emergency Management (C.E.M.). 
Many civil defense directors who were firmly 
entrenched in the more traditional civil defense 
activities were not enthusiastic about this new 
strategy. 
Comprehensive Emergency Management requires the 
development of some type of system to prevent, 
mitigate, prepare for, respond to and recover 
from any natural or man-made hazard or hostile 
military action (including nuclear attack) which 
could result in damage, injury or loss of life 
and property. CEM divides the activities into 
four phases: prevention/mitigation, prepared-
ness, response, and recovery. 
Prevention/mitigation encompasses those activ-
ities which actually reduce the probability 
of a disaster's occurrence: examples might 
include hurricane-resistant requirements in 
the building code, a coastal construction 
setback line or a flood relocation program. 
Preparedness activities include those actions 
which are necessary to the extent that mitiga-
tion measures have not, or cannot prevent 
disaster; examples include evacuation planning, 
installation of warning systems, and the for-
mulation of intergovernmental and mutual aid 
agreements. 
Response activities occur during and after an 
emergency and are designed to provide emergency 
assistance to people affected or threatened. 
Examples include evacuation, sheltering, 
emergency flood protection, and medical care. 
Recovery activities follow response and continue 
until the population returns to a predisaster 
condition. Examples include the provision of 
housing for disaster victims and debris removal. 
Over a longer term, recovery activities include 
building replacement and reconstruction. 
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Most traditional disaster planning has 
emphasized the preparedness, response and 
recovery phases of a disaster. These phases are 
the more action oriented while mitigation is 
newer and more regulatory. Mitigation, because 
it is newer was selected for more detailed 
analysis. 
MITIGATION 
THE FEDERAL GOVERNMENT MADE MITIGATION A 
CONDITION OF DISASTER RELIEF ASSISTANCE, CAUSING 
A DRAMATIC INCREASE IN MITIGATION INTEREST AT 
THE STATE LEVEL. HOWEVER, LITTLE EMPHASIS IS 
PLACED ON MITIGATION LOCALLY. 
Hazard mitigation activities are oriented toward 
long term prevention or reduction of a disaster 
resulting from natural or man-made emergencies. 
The Federal government holds the state 
res pons ib 1 e for mi ti gat ion activities. 
However, most authority needed to mitigate 
disaster is not at the state level but at the 
1 ocal level. 
Hazard mitigation can be viewed as long range 
p 1 anni ng to prevent persons and property from 
becoming vulnerable to the hazard in the first 
place. The local government can incorporate 
mitigation efforts in its comprehensive 
planning program and implement it through local 
tools such as: 
building codes 
zoning regulations 
subdivision regulations 
plan unit development requirements 
public facility locations 
coastal construction control lines (the 
state may implement these where the 
local government does not) 
open space controls 
preferential taxation 
transfer of development rights 
public acquisitions 
relocation of existing structures 
sand dune regulations 
septic tank regulations 
dispersing public information about hazards 
While many local governments in Florida have 
bui 1 ding codes which take into account the 
forces generated by high waters and hurricane 
waves, Jacksonvi 11 e does not have these provi-
sions in its building code. The City of 
Jacksonville is the only coastal area in Florida 
which uses the National Building Code, one of 
three standard codes suggested for adoption by 
local governments. The National Building Code 
does not address the different hazards such as 
forces generated by high velocity water faced in 
(j 
coastal areas. Jacksonville's code calls for 
minimum designs (about 100 mph) which might not 
withstand a hurricane's winds and wave action. 
The codes used in most other Florida co as ta 1 
cities call for designs to withstand 120 mph 
winds and studies on the subject ca 11 for 140 
mph protection. 
Although Jacksonville has a flood plain 
ordinance required t? qualify for the Federal 
government's flood 1nsurance program, little 
emphasis is placed on local hazard mitigation 
activities. 
COMMUNICATION 
COMMUNICATION IS ONE OF THE MOST ESSENTIAL 
ELEMENTS OF DISASTER PREPAREDNESS, YET IT IS 
OFTEN THE LEAST COORDINATED AND PREPARED. 
Communications may be divided into three parts. 
The first, occurring before a disaster is 
anticipated, is the day-to-day meetings and 
telephone conversations among agencies in pre-
paration and planning for a disaster. A second 
type, warnings, is directed at the general 
public from the responsible agencies. The final 
type of communications occurs among agencies and 
their staffs during the response and recovery 
stage. 
Inter-agency Communication: Pre- DIsaster 
Communications among agencies prior to a 
disaster is an important aspect of preparing 
for an adequate response by a multitude of agen-
cies during the disaster. Their communications 
are essential to keep disaster plans up-to-date 
with information such as correct names 
telephone numbers, site locations and respon: 
sibilities of individuals. During a multi-
agency response to any disaster situation, a 
much greater degree of cooperation and mutual 
understanding. will occur if those responding 
have met prev1ously and discussed, clarified and 
agreed upon their various responsibilities. 
In Jacksonville, there is a great deal of 
ongoing communication and coordination among 
most of the agencies with primary disaster 
response functions. Under the auspices of the 
Department of Public Safety a series of meetings 
has been held to develop standard operating pro-
cedures. These ongoing meetings, attended by 
those who will actually be responding can serve 
to anticipate problems and work out solutions 
prior to a disaster. 
The most notable example of this type of 
communication is evident from the activities of 
the Department of Public Safety's Hazardous 
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Materials Team. During this ongoing series of 
meetings, staff from the Fire Division, 
Sheriff's Office, Bio-Environmental Services 
Division, U. S. Coast Guard, Red Cross, Civil 
Defense, and others have analyzed past responses 
and developed a specific standard operating pro-
cedure outlining the responsibility of each 
agency to insure safe and professional action in 
hazardous materials incidents. 
In other areas of disaster response such as 
emergency communication, there is no ongoing 
committee to coordinate the emergency response 
and anticipate any problems. 
Warnings 
An effective warning system should consist of 
several stages. First, some individual or 
agency must determine the need to give a 
warning. Next, the warning must be disseminated 
by radio or television, warning devices (sirens, 
lights, etc.) or interpersonal interaction. 
Finally, the public must respond to the warning. 
Depending on the the type of threat, the 
warning can originate from a variety of 
agencies such as the weather serv1 ce, the 
police department, civil defense, or individ-
duals. These have a variety of mechanisms for 
obtaining information about the environment. 
An information network consisting of various 
types of radio, teletype, telephones and 
di vi dual observation or experience is used to 
obtain this information. One example, the 
National Warning System (NAWAS), is a dedicated 
phone line connecting a national network of 
disaster-responding agencies. NAWAS would be 
used to forecast a nuclear threat or for 
weather warnings. 
The passing of the warning to those individuals 
or groups who need to be informed, called the 
dissemination stage, uses commercial radio and 
television, National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration (NOAA) weather radio, Muzak, and 
person-to-person interaction. The sirens pre-
viously used in Jacksonville were eliminated due 
to their age, the cost of maintaining them and 
the limited area they covered. 
According to a recent research paper which 
reviewed literature on warnings, most people 
will seek verification from a credible source 
before responding to a warning. Most warning 
recipients will tend not to act until a message 
from one source is confirmed by two other 
sources. Most peop 1 e will not respond to a 
warning unless it meets certain criteria. An 
effective warning message should: 
contain authority figures of three kinds 
(political, technical, uniformed). 
have all warning figures in agreement. 
go to the home, church, or other areas where 
families gather rather than the work place. 
appeal to families, since decision-makers 
wi 11 act more quickly to protect 1 oved ones 
who depend on them rather than to protect 
themselves. 
contain an individually implementable action 
that will help the recipient to cope. The 
listeners will not retain the warning unless 
they feel empowered by the message. 
In Jacksonville, the warnings for most disasters 
should be issued through the the media vi a the 
Emergency Broadcasting System, through Muzak and 
through the NOAA weather service radio broad-
casts. The natural disaster plans call for the 
announcements to be made by the Ci vi 1 Defense 
Director. The warnings are not packaged in any 
special way to encourage the greatest response 
by the recipients. An increasing percentage of 
the local population is made up of one and two 
person households who are least 1 ikely to heed 
warnings. 
An apparent conflict in warning information can 
occur during hurricane reports. When a hurricane 
is offshore and moving towards land the position 
of the storm reported by the private weather 
services of the television stations may be in 
conflict with the official statement of the 
National Weather Service. The National Weather 
Service updates the position of the huricane by 
reports every two hours (in the future this will 
be done every hour) from the National Hurricane 
Center in Miami. During the intervening time 
the storm may be moving and its position is 
being continually tracked by numerous private 
weather radars of the television stations. 
Thus, the reports will often give what appears 
to be contradictory information. 
TYPES OF DISASTER 
Panic is extremely rare in disasters. Research 
indicates that panic will not occur unless there 
is a perceived threat, partial entrapment, par-
t i a 1 break down of escape routes and com-
munication failure. The fear of creating panic 
may cause officials to delay giving warnings. 
However, a well prepared, early warning will 
prevent the preconditions of panic from forming. 
Inter-agency Communication: Post Disaster 
The final type of communication of major concern 
during a disaster is that among the responsible 
agencies during the response and recovery 
phases. A variety of radio frequencies are 
used by agencies who must work together in re-
sponding to a disaster. 
After the Hurricane David experience in 1979 
re-emphasized to local officials the need for 
effective communications, a system of dedicated 
phone 1 i nes with back up radio capabi 1 i ty was 
installed to provide communication among the 
following groups during a disaster: 
Mayor's Office 
Civil Defense 
Public Works 
Red Cross 
School Board 
Sheriff/Fire 
Jacksonville Electric Authority 
Jacksonville Transportation Authority 
Navy 
Urban Service Districts 
Atlantic Beach 
Jacksonville Beach 
Baldwin 
Neptune Beach 
The Office of the Sheriff and the Fire 
Protection Division share the most sophisticated 
communications system in the county. This 
system might be impaired in an extreme emergency 
COMMUNICATION 
Inter-Agency 
Warning 
Inter-Agency 
Pre-Disaster Post-Disaster 
. During Preparedness . Directed to . Among all agencies 
Stage General Public and decision makers 
. Planning . Should contain . During Response and 
. Among Staff specific elements Recovery stages 
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situation, but it is flexible enough to continue 
some communications during a disaster. 
Other agencies with internal radio 
communications that would be used during a 
disaster include some divisions of the Public 
Works Department, the Jacksonville Electric 
Authority, the Jacksonville Transportation 
Authority, and the hospitals (through the 
Emergency Medical Radio System). Communications 
of these agencies can be coordinated at the com-
mand level. However, it is not possible for 
many of them to communicate among individuals 
working in the field. Some resource persQns 
stated that this field communication was needed 
but most said that it would cause undue expense 
and confusion and that the system required 'com-
munication only at the command level. 
Additional disaster communication capability 
exists through the mi 1 i tary, the American 
Radio Relay League (HAM) operators and the 
telephone company. The volunteer HAM operators 
are relied upon to provide emergency com-
munications among some agencies during a 
disaster. The American Red Cross and the 
American Radio Relay League have organized to 
provide communications among the National 
Weather Service, Civil Defense, and the American 
Red Cross shelters. They also have a long range 
system to communicate messages to relatives in 
other areas when standard communications are 
not avail ab 1 e. Southern Be 11 has designed its 
system to withstand most disaster situations. 
Even when the system is damaged it has the capa-
bility and plans for installing limited 
emergency communications immediately and 
restoring telephone communication in a short 
time following a disaster. 
The complexities of the emergency communica-
tions system during the response and recovery 
phase of a disaster make it extremely difficult 
to evaluate. Because of the continual updating 
and changing of communications capabilities, 
there is presently no written plan outlining 
the various frequencies and responsibilities 
for communication. In addition, there is no 
ongoing committee to coordinate emergency com-
munications among all of the private and public 
agencies. 
EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER 
THERE IS SUBSTANTIAL AGREEMENT AMONG DISASTER 
PROFESSIONALS HERE AND IN OTHER COMMUNITIES THAT 
A CENTRAL EMERGENCY OPERATING CENTER WHICH 
HOUSES ALL DECISION AND POLICY MAKERS, AND 
COMMUNICATIONS IN ONE LOCATION IS ESSENTIAL FOR 
GOOD DISASTER MANAGEMENT. However, there are 
presently three Emergency Operating Centers 
(EOC) in the following locations: the Mayor's 
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Office in City Hall, the Civil Defense Office on 
Market Street and the Police Memorial Building. 
The Civil Defense Emergency Operating Center 
uses an old building predating the 1901 
Jacksonville fire. Civil Defense facilities 
occupy the second floor with offices of the 
other Public Safety Divisions in the remainder 
of the building. The roof of this building 
holds an array of rusty old antennas which do 
not appear to be prepared to withstand any wind. 
In addition, the windows in the EOC do not have 
adequate protection. Though the Civil Defense 
D.ivision has worked to make this building into 
an effective EOC, funds have not been available 
to do an adequate job. In a major disaster, 
plans call for the building to house 120 people 
and serve as the central location for coor-
dination and control of all disaster response 
activities. 
In 1979 when hurricane David threatened to 
strike Jacksonville, the Mayor established and 
operated from an emergency communications center 
in his 14th floor office in City Hall. Though 
the need for coordination and communication 
during hurricane David made the City Hall loca-
tion appropriate, it may not be appropriate for 
future disasters. The wind broke windows in 
some high-rise buildings during Hurricane 
Frederic in. Mobile, in 1979, and caused the 
interior walls to collapse. Also, the ground 
floor of City Hall may be flooded during a storm 
cutting off this facility. 
There is a modern EOC located at the Police 
Memorial Building adjacent to the room con-
taining the main communications center used 
regularly for police and fire communications. 
This center has most of the facilities (radio 
and phone) of the Civil Defense Center with the 
addition of a more modern and versatile com-
munications system. During a disaster a command 
1 evel officer wi 11 be sent to Civi 1 Defense to 
coordinate with other organizations, and not 
duplicate the center. 
The Civil Defense Director from Harrison County, 
Mississippi, who has extensive experience in 
disasters including the super-hurricane, 
Camille, in 1969, maintains that Jacksonville's 
Civil Defense EOC is inadequate. He said that 
one location for all the required decision -
makers with the tools necessary to get the job 
done is essential for a good coordinated 
response to a disaster. 
LEARNING FROM A DISASTER 
DISASTERS IN OTHER AREAS WITH SIMILAR 
CHARACTERISTICS TO JACKSONVILLE CAN SUPPLY 
VALUABLE INFORMATION ON WHAT TO EXPECT FROM A 
MAJOR DISASTER. When Hurricane Camille struck 
the Mississippi Gulf Coast it left 132 people 
dead and destruction more comparable to a 
nuclear blast than to previously recorded 
storms. 
In the. af~ermath of the storm, water, power, 
commun1cat1ons, transportation, food distribu-
tion and fuel were completely cut off. There 
were 33,460 homes with significant damage and 
6,820 homes totally destroyed. Some of the 
recovery problems encountered and recommended 
solutions used in Harrison County, Mississippi 
are outlined below: 
A rumor control center was set up in the 
District Attorney's office to check out and 
prosecute anyone engaging in price gouging, 
looting, or hoarding emergency supplies. 
No looting or hoarding cases were confirmed 
following the disaster. 
The absence of electrical power following 
the storm created numerous additional 
problems. Without electricity many pumps 
could not be operated to provide sewage 
disposal, water or fuel. Refrigeration and 
ice became scarce. (Ice was critical for 
preservation of food and medical supplies). 
Several of the hospitals were unable to 
function. Hospitals in low lying areas 
were also rendered useless in severe 
flooding by limited access and destruction 
of auxiliary power. Lack of power to pump 
sewage can also force the shutdown of some 
hospitals. 
The most critical need, as previously 
mentioned, was for one central EOC to guide 
recovery efforts. A complex management 
system to distribute food, water and medi-
cal supplies and coordinate recovery must 
be deve 1 oped. 
. A. rigid public release policy by the chief 
executive is needed to eliminate conflicts 
in press releases. 
The distribution of goods by charitable 
organizations was not coordinated, 
causing inequities in the amounts some 
people received. This essential service 
was very welcomed but could have been 
better organized. 
NUCLEAR WAR 
PLANS FOR THE PROTECTION OF THE URBAN POPULATION 
IN A TARGET AREA DURING A NUCLEAR ATTACK ARE 
DEEMED UNREALISTIC EVEN BY THOSE RESPONSIBLE FOR 
DISASTER PLANNING. Policy-making for the pro-
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tection of the civilian population during a 
nuclear attack (nuclear civil protection plan-
ning) is the backbone of civil defense activ-
ity and comes from the Federal Emergency 
Management Agency. This Civil Defense planning 
is based on the assumption that the United 
States cannot protect the majority of the urban 
population from nuclear blasts, making eva-
cuation into rural areas (where fallout protec-
tion can be provided) imperative. This 
protection will be provided by expedient 
shelters (basically holes in the ground with log 
and dirt covers). 
These plans assume that the United States will 
be given advance notice (over three days) of any 
nuclear attack. The presumption is made that 
the Soviets will evacuate their cities prior to 
attacking. The Joint Chiefs of Staff maintain 
that there will be two weeks notice before a 
nuclear attack, due to the increase in inter-
national tension and this Soviet evacuation 
activity. This evacuation plan is labeled cri-
sis relocation planning. 
Duval County is considered to be a target risk 
area in the event of an attack. As they live in 
a target area, the population would be expected 
to move out of the city into 12 neighboring 
counties which are not considered to be targets. 
These rural counties surrounding Jacksonville do 
not have enough shelter for their own popul a-
tion, much less for the Duval population. 
Statewide, this evacuation policy calls for 
removing approximately 5.5 million of the 
state's 7.5 million population from the cities 
to areas without shelter or any system for 
supplying basic living necessities. 
Local, regional and state civil defense 
personnel all indicated a skepticism about the 
viability of this crisis relocation planning. 
The relocation alternative was probably chosen 
because it costs less than any other nuclear 
civil defense alternative . 
A second type of nuclear civil defense calls for 
sheltering the population locally. This method 
was the favored national policy when civil 
defense funding was higher back in the 60's. 
The buildings in Jacksonville were surveyed by 
the Corps of Engineers to determine their suita-
bility as fallout shelters. At the time, many 
of these shelters were stocked with provisions 
and marked with signs. 
It is now commonly acknowleged that economically 
feasible shelters cannot provide protection 
against the blast, heat, intense radiation, and 
mass fires that would probably occur in densely 
populated regions. Shelters could save lives 
only in places that were subject to nothing more 
than modest amounts of fa 11 out. Those in a 
target area when a bomb is detonated will not 
'·" 
' 
survive the blast. 
nuclear war is not 
not survivable in a 
is attacked. 
This does not mean that a 
survivable, but that it is 
densely populated area that 
The rate of survival of the population increases 
with their distance from the blast site. The 
all hazards approach to disaster planning offers 
methods to reduce the population 1 oss and 
respond to the disaster outside this impact 
area. 
PREPAREDNESS ORGANIZATIONS 
ALMOST ALL GOVERNMENTAL AGENCIES (FEDERAL, 
STATE, AND LOCAL) AS WELL AS AUTHORITIES, 
UTILITIES AND MANY PRIVATE ORGANIZATIONS ARE 
INVOLVED IN SOME ASPECT OF DISASTER 
PREPAREDNESS. In a major disaster everyone in 
the community may be affected directly or 
indirectly. All local resources as well as 
numerous resources from outside the area may be 
required. The organizations which have the 
res pons i bi 1 i ty for disaster management have the 
tasks of: 
minimizing any negative effects 
• coping with negative effects during and 
immediately following a disaster, 
• working to coordinate response and recovery 
These agencies plan, prepare for and provide 
a variety of services to disaster victims. 
Services include: 
Federal 
Evacuation 
Protection 
Shelter 
Medical Care 
Food 
Clothing 
Damage Repair 
Financial Assistance 
Debris clean-up 
The Federal Emergency Management Agency ( FEMA) 
is an independent agency of the Federal 
Government whose director is appointed by the 
President and confirmed by the Senate. FEMA was 
organized in 1979 to consolidate the several 
Federal level agencies with disaster prepared-
ness, hazard mitigation, emergency response and 
disaster recovery responsibilities. It combined 
those agencies with responsibilities for Civil 
Defense as well as peacetime disasters. 
1 1 
Over the years there has been a lack of 
continuity in Federal disaster programs and 
policies. The Federal agency responsible for 
disaster planning changed its name eight dif-
ferent times in recent years due to changes in 
legislation and administration. 
FEMA is not a first responder during a disaster 
because the only resources immediately available 
to a local community during a disaster are those 
1 ocated within the community. FEMA' s resources 
can be brought to the disaster site to help the 
1 ocal government only after the disaster has 
ended. 
FEMA works with states in developing operating 
plans for most emergency contingencies. It con-
ducts training programs in each state and assist 
the state in developing disaster plans. After 
the disaster, FEMA staff can be used to assist 
in preparing the damage assessment necessary 
before Presidential assistance is requested. 
Every Federal agency and substantial Federal 
funds are at the President's disposal to assist 
in the recovery efforts if an area is declared 
a disaster by Presidential Proclamation. 
The procedure for declaring a disaster begins 
with the local government using or committing 
all of its resources and calling the governor 
for assistance. Once the local government and 
the state government have committed (not used) 
all of their resources, the governor prepares a 
request for Federal assistance. The request, 
i ncl udi ng a damage assessment justified by FEMA 
employees, is sent to the President. After the 
President proclaims the disaster, a wide variety 
of programs become av a i 1 ab 1 e to i ndi vi dua 1 s in 
the area. 
There are 32 hazard mitigation programs of the 
Federal government that provide assistance, 
direct construction aid, training or grants to 
the state, regional and local agencies. These 
hazard mitigation efforts are aimed at reducing 
property damage and loss of life from both man-
made and natural disasters vi a everyday deci-
sions including land use planning, coastal zone 
protection and other long term development regu-
lations. Federal programs for disaster mitiga-
tion are available from: 
U.S. Department of Agriculture 
U.S. Department of Commerce 
U.S. Department of Defense 
U.S. Department of Health and Human 
Services 
U.S. Department of Housing and Urban 
Development 
U.S. Department of the Interior 
U.S. Department of Transportation 
Environmental Protection Agency 
Federal Emergency Management Agency 
FEMA is the primary funding source for state and 
local disaster related activities. Some FEMA 
funds can be released only by Presidential 
proclamation, while others are disbursed yearly 
to the states and local government for disaster 
preparation. 
State 
The responsibility for disaster preparedness for 
the State of Florida 1 i es with the Bureau of 
Disaster Preparedness in the Division of Public 
Safety, Planning and Assistance in the Depart-
ment of Veteran and Community Affairs. The 
emergency management programs of the State of 
Florida exist to deal with any threat for which 
there is not an existing permanent structure to 
maintain the health, safety, and welfare of the 
population. Because of this, state disaster 
responsibilities range from the contamination of 
water and the Cuban refugee crisis to historical 
responsibilities such as hurricanes and nuclear 
attacks. 
The Federal government holds the state responsi-
ble for mitigation activities. The state 
disaster mitigation responsibility includes: 
• Providing technical assistance to local 
governments 
Developing general mitigation policy 
guidelines 
• Bringing those po 11 ci es in 11 ne with the 
actual hazards in areas where the state 
has responsibilities (i.e. coastal 
construction control lines) 
The state preparedness responsibilities include 
establishing standards for local programs and 
preparing state plans designed to provide 
intergovernmental coordination. During the 
response phase of a disaster, the state provides 
assistance at the request of the local govern-
ment. However, if a disaster occurs with an 
overriding public safety issue requiring the 
immediate response of both the state and local 
resources, the governor has the authority and 
the responsibility to intervene. 
When the state goes into the comprehensive 
emergency management mode, the governor has the 
authority to call on all state agencies to pro-
vide assistance. Historically, the governor 
does not make a local disaster decision (such as 
an evacuation) without consulting the local 
chief elected official (in Jacksonville this is 
the Mayor). 
Recovery after the disaster is probably the 
weakest part of the state program. Florida law 
states that funds shall always be available for 
recovery. However, there is little money 
available from the state for disaster recovery. 
There is no effective mechanism for the state to 
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provide assistance to Jacksonville in a recovery 
operation except with Federal funds. 
The Federal government requires that the state 
and local governments pay 25% of all eligible 
recovery costs with the Federal government 
p~ing 75%. The reconstruction following a 
disaster might not be completed due to the ina-
bility of the local and state governments to 
furnish the required 25%. 
The Florida legislature is consider'ing 
legislation for a State Disaster Relief Trust 
Fund to make this matching money available. The 
state would provide half and the local govern-
ment would provide half. If necessary, the 
state would loan the local government the money 
for the local share. The legislation calls for 
an initial trust fund of $10 million dollars 
enough to cover most disasters but not enough 
to cover a major hurricane striking a large 
city. 
Legislation providing for disaster preparedness 
activities in the State of Florida created the 
Bureau of Disaster Preparedness, and authorized 
the creation of local organizations for disaster 
preparedness. It conferred emergency powers on 
the governor and local officials, provided -for 
mutual aid agreements and set up the purposes 
and means by which disaster preparedness activi-
tes could be accomplished. 
Local 
The Civil Defense Division of the Public Safety 
Department of the City of Jacksonville is 
charged with disaster mitigation, preparedness, 
response, and recovery responsibilities. Its 
primary purpose is to coordinate the plans and 
regulations of the Federal and state and other 
local disaster preparedness agencies. 
A 1 oca 1 ordinance es tab 1 i shed the C ivi 1 Defense 
Planning Counci 1 to coordinate and direct the 
disaster preparedness activities of all agencies 
in the city. This planning council consists of: 
• The Mayor as Chairman 
Director of Department of Public Safety, 
City of Jacksonville as Vice-Chairman 
Director of Department of Health, 
Welfare, and Bio-Environmental 
Services 
Director of Department of Public Works, 
City of Jacksonville 
Sheriff 
Chief Judge of the IV Judicial Circuit 
Chairman of Jacksonville Electric Authority 
• Chairman of Duval County Hospital Authority 
• Chairman of the Jacksonville Port Authority 
• Chairman of the Jacksonville Transportation 
Authority 
Commanding Officer of the Naval Air Station 
J acksonvi 11 e 
Commanding Officer, Mayport Naval Station 
Commanding Officer, Cecil Field Naval Air 
Station 
Mayor, Jacksonville Beach 
Mayor, Atlantic Beach 
Mayor, Neptune Beach 
Mayor, Baldwin 
Administrator, District IV, Florida 
Department of Health and Rehabilitative 
Services 
Chapter Manager of American Red Cross 
Administrative Supervisor, Southern Bell 
Telephone and Telegraph Company 
Director of Civil Defense Division, 
Department of Public Safety, City of 
J acksonvi 11 e 
This planning council must recommend to the City 
Council a civil defense plan conforming with 
state and Federal guidelines and mutual aid 
agreements and interjurisdictional agreements 
with appropriate agencies. The Planning Council 
also conducts a continuing study of the need for 
amendments to and improvements in the civil 
defense plans. 
The members of the planning council represent 
each of the city agencies having respon-
sibilities during a disaster. The type of 
disaster and its dimensions determine what role 
each agency will play and which agency has pri-
mary responsibility for each aspect of the 
disaster. Usually the designated members of 
this planning council do not attend its 
meetings, but send representatives specialized 
in the areas under discussion. 
The city's disaster ordinance temporarily 
modifies the city governmental structure when 
the mayor declares a disaster. The mayor, 
assisted by the Director of Public Safety, 
controls this organization to execute the civil 
defense p 1 an. The mayor is the head of the 
civil defense organization and is responsible 
for the prompt, efficient execution of the civil 
defense plan as necessary to: 
• Reduce the vulnerability of the people and 
the city to damage, injury and a 1 os s 
of life and property. 
• Prepare for and execute rescue, care and 
treatment of persons victimized or 
threatened by disaster. 
• Provide a setting conducive to the rapid 
and orderly start of restoration and 
rehabi 1 i tat ion of persons and property 
affected by a disaster. 
The Civil Defense Division 
disaster plans of the city's 
coordinates the 
departments, the 
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Authorities, the Office of the Sheriff, and 
other local organizations with disaster 
responding roles. Each organization is charged 
with de vel oping its annex to the overall plan 
and with working on joint plans when required. 
The disaster plans are designed to make use of 
existing employees in appropriate activities. 
The type of disaster determines which organiza-
tions are called upon and which one is in 
charge. 
The city's disaster ordinance designates the 
mayor as the ultimate authority in the reorga-
nized governmental structure during a disaster. 
However, the sheriff does not answer to the 
mayor, because he is a constitutional officer of 
the State and is responsible to the Governor. 
Both the sheriff and mayor are elected officials 
answerable directly to the people. 
Nevertheless, in an emergency situation the 
mayor's office acts as the major coordinating 
body and a command level member of the sheriff's 
office is sent as liaison with Civil Defense. 
Private Sector 
The American Red Cross is the major private 
responder to disasters in Jacksonville. By 
Congressional Charter, the mission of the 
American Red Cross in the time of natural 
disaster is to provide for needs of the people. 
More specifically, the American Red Cross' role 
is to provide needy disaster victims with food, 
clothes, shelter, and medical care. 
The Jacksonville Area Chapter of the American 
Red Cross has a pool of 300 trained volunteers, 
and 16 Red Cross professionals. When appropriate 
it can seek support from the hierarchy (regional 
and national levels) in its organization. The 
disaster preparedness team of Red Cross has per-
sons trained as doctors, nurses, heavy equipment 
operators, cooks, engineers, clerks, and radio 
operators. 
A primary function of the Red Cross is to 
provide shelter for disaster victims. Shelter 
facilities consist chiefly of public schools 
scattered in convenient 1 ocati ons. Agreements 
with the School Board make these immediately 
available in the event of a disaster. The Red 
Cross also has secured the promise of shelter 
facilities in church buildings, clubs and hotels 
in the event of a greater need. Other Red Cross 
disaster activities include: 
• Assessing damage 
• Acquiring food 
• Supplementing public and private health 
agencies in supplying medical aid and 
nursing care 
Obtaining and distributing clothing as 
needed to disaster sufferers (this func-
tion is also performed by the Salvation 
Army) 
. Coordinating news releases 
Providing communications service 
. Providing transportation 
Assisting in voluntary evacuation and 
rescue 
Although the various public and private 
organizations mentioned previously have respon-
sibilities for assisting the public with 
disasters, each individual is responsible for 
his own disaster and evacuation plans. 
Exceptions to this include some handicapped and 
persons in licensed group care facilities. 
Handicapped i ndi vi dua 1 s who responded to a sur-
vey mailed out with utility bills will receive 
evacuation assistance during a disaster (via JTA 
buses) through the Handicap Evac program. 
Evacuation plans for group care facilities such 
as nursing homes and hospitals are the respon-
sibility of the operators of the facilities. 
Individuals living in multi-unit housing (i.e. 
high-rise buildings at the beach) that are not 
licensed group care facilities are responsible 
for their own plans. However, many people are 
not aware that this is their responsibility. 
Military 
The extent of military involvement in a local 
disaster depends on the dimensions of the 
disaster. Depending on these dimensions, the 
Navy, Army, National Guard, and/or Coast Guard 
may become involved in civilian operations. 
The Navy has a good neighbor policy with local 
governments and will attempt to help in any 
1 ocal emergency requiring its assistance. When 
an immediate threat to life exists, the local 
Commanding Officer can immediately assist 
the City. However, as 1 ong as the Navy is not 
specifically needed to save lives or property it 
is restricted by higher directives from 
assisting in civilian disaster. The primary 
disaster plans of the Navy are for Naval person-
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nel and facilities, not for civilians. The 
dependent population is the responsibility of 
the local government during a disaster. 
When the governor proclaims a state of disaster 
emergency, he may call up the National Guard to 
respond to the disaster. The 1 oca 1 government 
may request assistance with communications, 
transportation or emergency el ectri city genera-
tion from the National Guard • 
In the most severe situation, such as a military 
attack, the President can federalize the 
National Guard into the active Army and call on 
this Army to respond to local disaster needs. 
It is the Army, not the Navy, that is charged 
with assisting Civil Defense and local govern-
ments in the event of a major disaster. The 
First Army, covering the Eastern portion of the 
United States, would take charge if called upon 
for assistance. In this extreme situation all 
of the resources of all mi 1 i tary branches would 
be made available and coordinated through the 
Army. 
If the situation requires it, the President can 
declare martial law. Under martial law the mili-
tary command comes in and takes over the entire 
operation of city government including police, 
fire, garbage collection, etc. The military are 
usually the last to recommend martial law. 
Declarations of martial law are rare and most 
professionals recommend against them. 
The U.S. Coast Guard has a statutory authority 
to look after the public health and welfare of 
any maritime or marine related problem. The 
Coast Guard's regulatory authority over hazard-
ous material in the port serves as a hazard 
mitigation activity. From the Coast Guard's 
point of view, the major potential for a 
disaster in Jacksonville is a hurricane. Its 
role prior to a hurricane includes checking all 
waterfront faci 1 i ties and vessels to determine 
if they might pose a threat and requiring their 
removal during a hurricane, as well as the role 
of search and rescue. 
Both the Navy and Coast Guard personnel 
regularly change duties. This policy prevents 
continuity among the staff with disaster respon-
sibilities. Staff with expertise in 
Jacksonville's disaster response system may be 
transfered to another city before replacements 
can become familiar with local disaster pro-
fessionals. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Conclusions express the value judgment of the committee, based on the findings. 
1. The citizens and officials have limited or 
no experience in Jacksonville with major 
disasters such as hurricanes and thus are 
less prepared than these living in areas 
with more frequent disasters. 
2. There is a great need for people to become 
educated about the dangers from and prepara-
tion needed for disasters. However, people 
generally do not pay attention to such 
information until a crisis is imminent. 
3. A hurricane is potentially the greatest 
natural hazard faced in Jacksonville yet 
people do not realize the danger. During 
and immediately after a major hurricane the 
city could expect: 
Just hours before the storm the weather 
may be clear and the wind light. 
In a severe hurricane such as Cami 11 e, a 
wall of water or storm surge up to 20 
feet in height would come ashore capable 
of destroying any bui 1 dings on the beach 
in its path. This surge could pass over 
the entire barrier island from the beach 
to the Intercoastal Waterway. 
Depending on the wind direction, tides 
and direction of the hurricane, water 
backed up in the rivers and estuaries 
could cause extensive inland flooding 
covering roads and cutting off many 1 ow 
lying areas. 
A 1 arge percentage of the residences at 
the beaches would be damaged or 
destroyed. All of them could be unin-
habitable due to lack of power, water, 
sewage disposal. 
Electrical power would be disrupted all 
over the city. Without this power, pumps 
could not operate to provide fuel, water, 
or sewage disposal. Refrigeration would 
not operate to preserve food and medical 
supplies. 
Inland flooding would damage and render 
unusable many low lying buildings along 
the waterways of the county. This could 
mean that several hospitals could not be 
used and that access would be cut off 
from most governmental offices downtown. 
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. Trees, powerlines and other windblown 
debris would make most roads impassable 
and hinder rescue and restoration 
efforts. 
4. Because of the movement of a hurricane bet-
ween the periodic NOAA weather reports and 
the continual tracking of the radar at tele-
vision stations, apparent contradictions 
occur abo• · t the 1 oca t ion of hurricanes from 
the local stations and the National Weather 
Service. 
5. Routing certain materials around the city 
rather than directly through the urbanized 
areas would minimize the hazard of a 
disastrous accident to population centers. 
6. The professionals charged with responding 
to disasters in Jacksonville are well 
organized and appear well prepared to 
respond to most small incidents (fires, 
hazardous materials accidents, etc.) which 
might threaten the city. 
7. Although many professionals with disaster 
responsibilities meet regulary, some do 
not. All specialized professionals respon-
sible for disaster response need to have 
ongoing meetings with those others who 
share responsibility. 
8. More local emphasis on hurricane hazard 
mitigation now would save lives and pro-
perty when a major storm strikes 
Jacksonville. A strong building code is 
an effective mechanism for local hazard 
mitigation. Jacksonville's Building Code 
does not require withstanding hurricane 
forces as do the codes of other coastal 
cities. 
9. An effective system of communications is 
required before a disaster is anti-
cipated, during the warning announcement 
and during the response and recovery 
stages. 
Most of the agencies sharing disaster 
responsibilities in Jacksonville do not 
meet and plan regularly in preparation 
for various types of disaster. In many 
areas such as emergency communications 
there is no ongoing communication to 
coordinate and anticipate problems in 
responding to an emergency. 
The method of warning the population and 
obtaining the desired response has not 
received adequate attention in 
Jacksonville. Warnings should contain 
specific elements in order to be effec-
tive. 
• Conflicting sources of information in a 
warning confuse the public and reduce 
the chance of obtaining the desired 
response. 
• The lack of interagency coordination has 
made the system less effective than it 
might be. 
10. Jacksonville does not have a single 
adequately equipped and staffed emergency 
operating center designed to hold all deci-
sion and policy makers and communications 
facilities necessary for effective recovery 
from a major disaster. Jacksonville's 
Civil Defense Division Emergency Operating 
Center is inadequate due to its small size, 
poor layout, and physical condition. 
11. As the name Civil Defense Division 
suggests, the primary emphasis on disaster 
planning in Jacksonville is for a nuclear 
attack. A more realistic approach would be 
to use an all hazards approach and stress 
hurricane planning. 
12. The ongoing rotation of local Coast Guard 
and Navy staff precludes the continuity 
needed to adequately coordinate with local 
disaster workers. 
13. One coordinated information source and a 
rumor control mechanism is needed for a 
disaster. 
14. Currently, there is no adequate protection 
from a nuclear attack in an impact area. In 
addition, there is no realistic way to eva-
cuate the entire population of Jacksonville 
into the surrounding counties as planned. 
However, the all hazards approach will 
offer plans to respond to a limited nuclear 
disaster. Real protection from nuclear 
attack can come only from national and 
international policy changes designed to 
reduce the threat of nuclear war. 
15. Local and state recovery funds required by 
FEMA to partially match Federal disaster 
assistance are not available. Thus, damage 
from a major disaster is unlikely to be 
fully restored due to lack of these 
matching funds. 
RECOMMENDATIONS 
Recommendations are the committee's specific suggestions for change, based on the findings and concl u-
s ions. 
1. The Jacksonville Civil Defense Division 
should pro vi de an a 11 hazards approach to 
disaster planning covering all types of 
disasters with emphasis on hurricanes. 
The name should be changed to the Jackson-
ville Emergency Management Division (or 
something similar) of the Department of 
Public Safety. 
2. The Civil Defense Division, American Red 
Cross, and National Weather Service 
should work with the local media to im-
prove the education of the general public 
on what to expect from a disaster, 
especially a hurricane and how they should 
prepare for it. There should be an ongoing 
effort to take the message to all segments 
of the public. 
3. A 11 of the designated members of the C i vi 1 
Defense Planning Council should meet at 
least once a year for a staff briefing on 
the officials' responsibilities, their 
location during the disaster, and with whom 
they will be directly working, including an 
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overview of the likely disasters faced and 
expected effects faced by Jacksonville. 
4. The Mayor should require a staff level 
committee representing each of the members 
of the Civil Defense Planning Council to 
meet quarterly to coordinate and update 
disaster plans and communications. 
5. The local news media and National Weather 
Service should develop an agreement to pool 
information on weather bulletins to aviod 
conflicts in warning of the location of 
severe weather. 
6. The Civil Defense Division should prepare a 
specific plan for a more effective warning 
package to include specifics of who should 
give the warning and its wording. 
7. The Mayor should develop a plan for a 
single source, rigid public release mecha-
nism to provide a consistent source of 
official information during and after a 
disaster, including a rumor control mecha-
nism adequate for the entire population. 
8. The Mayor should develop, for the City 
Council's approval, regulations with regard 
to the routing of hazardous materials 
around rather than through the city. 
9. The City's Building and Zoning Division 
should examine the local building codes to 
see if they are adequate to cover a pro-
bable hurricane in the Jacksonville area. 
Special emphasis should be placed on 
construction in the beach areas. 
10. The Mayor, through the Public Safety 
Division and in Cooperation with the Office 
of the Sheriff, should recommend to the 
City Council the establishment of a single 
adequately equipped emergency operating 
center designed to hold all decision and 
policy makers and communication facilities 
during and after a major disaster. 
11. The local military should designate a 
civilian employee to act as a disaster 
liaison to provide continuity with local 
disaster agencies. 
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The Jacksonville Community Council, Inc. (JCCI) 
was formed to anticipate, identify and address 
the complex issues of urban life. JCCI is a 
community-based nonpartisan, nonprofit organi-
zation providing the vehicle for in-depth, 
objective, citizen analysis of community 
problems and 1ssues. It seeks broader community 
awareness and understanding of the issues and 
provides Jacksonville a diverse citizen forum 
reaching across the traditional dividing lines 
of a complex and diverse urban community. 
The primary goal of JCCI is a better quality of 
life in Jacksonville through positive change. 
It has a short but impressive record for the 
quality, objectivity, clarity, and practicality 
of its studies of community problems, and 
its advocacy for the solutions it develops. 
Jacksonville has experienced the benefits of 
numerous improvements growing from these citi-
zen studies. 
Other JCCI goals grow largely from its focus on 
positive change. High on the list are the edu-
cation and dialogue the studies themselves pro-
vide to participants. The work of JCCI 
strengthens citizen competence and awareness, 
provides for ongoing dialogue among diverse ele-
ments of the community, and serves as a catalyst 
for bringing together decision-makers. 
JCCI is founded on a deep faith in the ability 
of citizens to set aside their differences and join together to learn and reason about problems 
of mutual concern. Its growth and success offer 
renewed hope for this basic democratic concept 
as a means of addressing the complex issues of 
modern urban communities. 
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The JCCI membership now exceeds 500 citizens 
representative of all parts of the Jacksonville 
community. 
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